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GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC LOSSES: THE 
CASE OF REGULATORY FAILURE 
David Cohen* 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
Compensation claims against provincial and federal govern- 
ments are largely a product of the second half of the 20th century. 
The initial surge of cases after the enactment of the federal Crown 
Liability Act1 in 1953 - mirrored also in developments at the 
provincial level - were typically "private" tort claims. Indeed a 
significant percentage of claims against the federal government 
continue to be nothing more than automobile accident, occupier 
liability claims and lawsuits arising out of similar relatively minor 
bureaucratic  error^.^ 
Recently, however, as a result of both the imagination of 
litigators and the growth of the regulatory state, claims against 
governments have extended to claims for recovery of economic 
losses related to the negligent enforcement of building 
 regulation^,^ the negligent failure to resolve labour disputes in the 
federal civil ~ e r v i c e , ~  the negligent regulation of financial 
in~titutions,~ and the failure to enact regulations establishing oil 
and gas royalties payable to Indian bands.6 
This flurry of litigation has led some to claim that the courts are 
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. This is the revised 
version of a paper presented at the Economic Negligence Symposium, sponsored by the 
Canadian Business Law Journal and held at the Faculty of Law of the University of 
Toronto, on April 19,1991. I would like to note the assistance of Paul Fairweather in the 
preparation of this paper. 
S.C. 1952-53, c. 30 -now R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50. 
See D. Cohen, "Regulating Regulators: The Legal Environment of the State" (1990), 40 
U.T.L.J. 213, at DD. 247-50. 
3 See ~ a m l o o j k  (diiy) v. Nielson (1984), 10 D.L.R. (4th) 641, [I9841 2 S.C.R. 2. 
See Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd. v. Canada (1976), 71 D.L.R. (3d) 421, [I9771 1 F.C. 
715,affd87D.L.R. (3d)511,[1979] 1 F.C. 39. 
See Baird v. Canada (1983), 148 D.L.R. (3d) 1,48 N.R. 276 (F.C.A.). 
6 See Alexander Indian Band No. I34 (Council) v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs & 
Northern Development), [I9911 2 F.C. 3,39 F.T.R. 142. 
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becoming more active in their willingness to review regulatory 
activities of government agencies. Between 1984 and 1990, the 
popular literature and case reports were replete with suggestions 
that the courts order governments to address losses associated 
with public vaccination  programme^,^ to compensate tobacco 
farmers for losses associated with increases in levels of taxation 
representing government policy to reduce s m ~ k i n g , ~  t o  
compensate haemophiliacs who have tested HIV po~i t ive ,~  to
address the claims of persons who suffered birth defects after their 
mothers ingested thalidomide,1° and to provide compensation to a 
woman who, as one of a number of patients, received repeated 
electroshock therapy at a Montreal psychiatric institute as part of a 
federally funded programme.ll 
Both the popular and legal rhetoric suggest an image of govern- 
ments under attack in the courts. However, closer examination of 
the facts of litigation, at least against the federal government, 
suggests that perhaps here, as nowhere else in tort law, "the lines 
have held".12 The 1990 Public Accounts of Canada lists all govern- 
mental expenditures by department for the fiscal year ending on 
March 31, 1990. In that year, the expenditures of the federal 
government totalled $131,945 ,022,000.13 Excluding legal expenses 
See RothweN v. Rues (1990), 76 D.L.R. (4th) 280,2 O.R. (3d) 332 (C.A.), affg 54 D.L.R. 
(4th) 193,66 O.R.  (2d) 449, and supp. reasons at 59 D.L.R. (4th) 319,69 O.R. (2d) 62 
(action against manufacturer, distributor and Crown dismissed for failure to  demonstrate 
sufficient causal connection between vaccine and injuries): see also, "Medical groups urge 
program to compensate vaccine victims", The Globeand Mail, January2,1987, at p. A14; 
"Taking on Ottawa: Action Groups Wait, Wonder", The Toronto Star, October 18,1990, 
at p. 11. 
8 See "Former tobacco farmers taking government to court", The Globe and Mail, Report 
on Business, May 11,1990, at p. B5. 
9"Taking on Ottawa: Action Groups Wait, Wonder", supra, footnote 7 at p. I t .  The 
claim, which is being pursued by the Canadian Haemophilia Society, alleges that 
Canada's blood-screening system was not in place until 12 months after New Zealand's 
and nine months after that of the United States. 
'0 Ibid., at p. 11. The Thalidomide Victims Association of Canada is claiming $10 million 
on behalf of the victims, alleging that the federal government shares liability with the 
manufacturer because it licensed the use of the product in Canada. 
l 1  "Woman stripped of memory seeks redress", The Globe and Mail, March 6,1990. 
l2  Jeremy Rabkin argues that, in the United States, claims against the federal government 
rose much more slowly in the period from 1975-1986 than did general product liability 
litigation. As well, his data suggests that "The federal government . . . continues to 
prevail in the overwhelming majority of tort claims filed against it.": see J.  Rabkin, 
"Where the Lines Have Held: Tort Claims against the Federal Government", in New 
Directions in Liability Law (1988), 37(1) Proc. Acad. Pol. Sc., at pp. 112-25, Walter 
Olsen, ed. 
l 3  This excludes some $487,263,000 in federal government loans, investments and 
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as a cost element,14 the total amount of money paid out by the 
government in respect of what might loosely be called "damage 
claims" during the 1990 fiscal year totalled only $16,423,000; this 
represented only .0001244 of the total budgetary expenditures. 
This $16 million figure consists of settlements and damage claims 
($14,524,350); ex gratia payments ($921,000);15 Federal Court 
awards ($732,749);16 and nugatory payments ($246,000).17 In 
other words, about 1/10,00Oth of the federal budget in 1990 was 
paid out in compensation claims. This 1/10,00Oth of the federal 
budgetary expenditures represented all settlements and 
payments, including contract, property, traditional tort claims and 
so on. Only a small proportion represented "economic loss" 
claims - hardly a crisis by any standards. l8 
What then has spawned the perception that governments are 
being subjected to intolerable levels of legal liability? One expla- 
nation for the recent reports of litigation, as well as for many of the 
cases decided in recent years, was the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Kamloops (City) v. Nielson,19 which began the 
advances: see Table 2, "General Summary Non-budgetary", Vol. 11, Public Accounts of 
Canada, 1989-90, Part 1, Details of Expenditures and Revenues, at 1.8-1.9. 
l 4  Legal expenses are reported by Department in Section 5 of the Public Accounts, as 
Professional and Special Services: see Vol. 11, Public Accounts of Canada, 1989-90, Part 
11, Additional Information and Analyses. In the 1989-90 fiscal year, departmental expen- 
ditures for legal services totalled $42,249,666: see Vol. 11, Public Accounts of Canada, 
1989-90, Part 11, Additional Information and Analyses, at 5.3. However, there is no 
information as to whether this represents actual expenditures for legal services from 
firms outside government, or an internal accounting technique representing an intergo- 
vernmental accounting of services to departments provided by the Department of 
Justice. More importantly, there is no information as what percentage of this figure 
represents litigation expenses, as compared to expenses incurred in policy development 
and the provision of general legal advice. 
This figure excludes a payment of $21,000 per person to individuals claiming compen- 
sation under the Japanese Redress Program (P.C. 1988-8912552) from the Ministry of 
State (Multiculturalism and Citizenship) totalling $263,970,283: see Vol. 11, Public 
Accounts of Canada, 1989-1990, Part 11, at 9.18-9.114. 
l6 This includes $150,000 in Federal Court awards awarded on income tax appeals: see Vol. 
11, Public Accountsof Canada, 1989-90, Part 11, Additional Information and Analyses, at 
9.117-9.118. 
l7 Formally, nugatory payments are awarded in respect of claims in which "no value or 
service has been received, but for which a liability is recognized": see Vol. 11, Public 
Accountsof Canada, 1989-90, Part 11, at 9.119. 
ls One point which should be noted is that the damage claim figure excludes situations 
where legislative programmes have been developed to respond to compensation claims 
which might otherwise have been subject to litigation: see, for example, "Medical groups 
urge program to compensate vaccine victims", supra, footnote 7; "Compensation 
Pushed for Kids Harmed by Shots," The Vancouver Sun, November 21,1986; "Canada 
Eyes Compensation Plan for Vaccine Injuries", The Medical Post, December 9,1986. 
l9 Supra, footnote 3. Some aspects of the now famous "two-stage" approach to determining 
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modern era of tort litigation against governments in Canada. The 
recent cases before the Supreme Court have confirmed that 
employment of the Anns doctrine continues to be the court's 
preferred approach to government liability clairns.*O Indeed, 
notwithstanding the criticism of the Supreme Court of Canada's 
decision in Just v. British C ~ l u r n b i a , ~ ~  I would argue that the 
Supreme Court has simply continued the approach it took in 1984. 
Kamloops v. Nielson did, however, dramatically transform the 
approach which the judiciary would take from then on in 
addressing government liability claims. First, it represented an 
explicit confirmation of the two-stage Anns approach to determi- 
nations as to the existence of a legal duty of care. The first stage of 
the test - foreseeability of risk of injury -would almost always 
be met in government liability claims, given the planned and 
complicated institutional character of much of modern 
government activity. 
Thus, the analysis of government liability claims has, from 1984 
onwards, invariably involved the application of the second stage of 
the Anns formula. This second stage requires explicit judicial 
assessment of the policy considerations relevant to a decision to 
expose the government to, or insulate it from, legal responsibility. 
Kamloops has undoubtedly transformed the traditional judicial 
search for abstract, highly conceptual "legal duties of care" into a 
much more pragmatic assessment of the role of the judiciary in 
relation to the exercise of bureaucratic power, and of the implica- 
tions of imposing liability on regulatory programmes and on 
private markets. 
liability as expressed in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, 119781 A.C. 728 
(H.L.), had earlier been adopted in several lower court rulings and in at least one 
- 
Supreme Court of Canada decision. 
However, these decisions dealt with activities which had obvious private counterparts 
and did not, at least in the same way as Kamloops, raise the spectre of governmental 
liability for economic losses associated with regulatory failure: see Welbridge Holdings 
Ltd. v. Greater Winnipeg (Metropolitan Corp.) (1971), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 470, [I9711 
S.C.R. 957 (no liability for failure at the legislative or quasi-judicial level to take 
reasonable care in following procedures for enacting by-law); Barratt v. North Vancouver 
(District) (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 577, [I9801 2 S.C.R. 418 (no liability for policy 
decisions relating to road inspection); Malat v. Bjornson (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 612, 
[I9811 2 W.W.R. 67 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused D.L.R. loc. cit. 
(liability for negligent operational decision involving failure to construct median barrier 
after a decision to do so had been made). 
mThe approach of the Supreme Court in its 1989 decision in Rothjield v. Manolakos 
(1989), 63 D.L.R. (4th) 449, [I9891 2S.C.R. 1259, is virtually indistinguishable from that 
in Kamloops v. Nielson, supra, footnote 3. 
21 (1989), 64 D.L. R. (4th) 689, [I9891 2 S.C. R. 1228. 
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Second, Kamloops has been interpreted as permitting recovery 
for "pure" economic losses. Since much of what government does 
is to redistribute wealth either purposefully, contingently or 
inadvertently, the case represented an opportunity for rapid 
judicial expansion of recovery for government-induced losses. 
This recognition of legal responsibility for economic risks 
associated with government action was coupled with the appli- 
cation of common law tort principles to a clear instance of "regu- 
latory failure", in contrast to the more common use of tort law to 
regulate bureaucrats by holding them liable for behaviour which 
would be tortious if done by a private individual. Given that 
governments are often engaged in regulatory activities which have 
no obvious private analogue, Kamloops should be, and indeed 
was, seen as the vehicle through which the courts could mediate 
claims for a range of losses generated by less than competent 
bureaucrats engaged in the myriad of activities designed to create 
and distribute economic entitlements directly, and to regulate the 
creation and distribution of wealth by private actors.22 
Third, Kamloops was one of the first cases in Canada in which 
the Supreme Court was explicit in stating the source of the 
common law duty of care; the kinds of interests protected by the 
courts through the application of the duty of care in tort; and the 
class of persons who were entitled to claim compensation for their 
losses as a result of the breach of that duty: these factors were all to 
be identified through a close analysis of the legislative and 
regulatory framework within which the bureaucracy was 
operating. It is true that the court has rejected the concept of 
"breach of statutory duty", and reaffirmed its commitment to the 
idea that the tort liability of public authorities would continue to 
be founded in a common law private duty of care. None the less, 
reading Kamloops and virtually every case since 1984 confirms 
that the legislative responsibility of the regulatory authority holds 
the key to the existence and definition of its legal liability. 
22 In this article, I focus my attention on tort claims which arise from regulatory failure in an 
effort to capture the distinctive character of government action and the wav in which it 
affects the -economic interests of private firms. Thus, I do not analyze recent cases 
involving non-regulatory activity in which governments have been sued, as these cases 
are invariably indistinguishable from private tort law cases: see Stuart v. Canada, [I9891 2 
F.C. 3, (19881 6 W.W.R. 211 (application of Alberta Occupiers' Liability Act, R.S.A. 
1980, c. 0-3, s. 5, to the federal government in respect of a claim for compensation for 
personal injuries incurred as a result of a fall in a parking lot); Rmmussen v. Canada 
(Ministry of Fisheries & Oceans) (19891 2 F.C. 651,24 F.T.R. 86 (claim for value of fish 
unlawfully seized and sold by the federal government to a Crown corporation). 
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Finally, Kamloops, like Anns, purported to collapse the 
historical distinction between acts of commission and omission 
and, at least for the purposes of governmental liability, assimilated 
bureaucratic failure to act and active wrongdoing. As I argue later, 
this distinction is required in the case of governments once one 
accepts that the source of legal responsibility is the regulatory 
programme which the bureaucracy is entrusted to implement. 
Liability for failing to act, when applied to private individuals 
carries with its enormous implications in terms of ideas about 
causation and of liberal ideas of personal obligation - leaving 
aside the pragmatic difficulty of defining the boundaries of legal 
responsibility. Conversely, liability for failing to act, when applied 
to public bureaucracies requires only that we identify the positive 
social obligation articulated in the relevant legislative authority 
pursuant to which the bureaucracy was operating. 
Since Kamloops, the Supreme Court of Canada has had several 
opportunities to reconsider this approach to government liability 
with results which have not changed the judicial terrain to any 
significant degree. In Cory J., speaking for the court, 
clearly rejected recent Commonwealth decisions which 
themselves had retreated from Anns, and reaffirmed that the 
Supreme Court would continue to employ the two-stage formula 
which it had adopted from Anns some six years earlier in the 
Kamloops case. While some might argue with Cory J. about where 
we should draw the line between policy and operational decisions, 
and while there is some language in the judgment which suggests 
that even policy decisions might incorporate an element of judicial 
review for reasonableness, virtually all of the judgment reflects 
precisely the ideas which the Supreme Court earlier expressed in 
Kamloops. 24 
Supra, footnote 21. 
24 What is very interesting is the resulting ambivalence of lower courts faced with the two 
very different approaches - the so-called liberal or expansive approach taken in the 
Supreme Court and the much more conservative and restrictive doctrine in the Common- 
wealth cases. The result is a series of very confusing judgments at the trial and appellate 
levels, which will certainly lead to future Supreme Court of Canada decisions seeking to  
clarify the issue: see, for example, Longchamps v.  Farm Credit Corp., [I9901 6 W.W.R. 
536,108 A.R. 115 (Q.B.) (government agency not liable for negligence in assessing loan 
application); Akhtar v .  MacGillivray & Co.,  [I9911 2 W.W.R. 489,112 A.R. 242 (Q.B.) 
(no liability in Securities Commission for alleged negligent assessment of corporate infor- 
mation). In both these cases, the courts seem to collapse the two lines of authority - 
notwithstanding their apparent contradictory approaches. As I argue later, however, I 
am not certain that much of this matters. 
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11. TWO VIEWS OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF COURTS TO 
GOVERNMENTS 
From 1984 until today, we have witnessed both academic and 
judicial consternation, if not admitted confusion, about how to 
respond to claims in tort for recovery of economic losses 
associated with maladministration, bureaucratic negligence and 
regulatory failure. One important reason for this confusion is the 
tension between two very different views which the courts seem to 
have of their relationship with the modern bureaucratic state. 
These contradictory views - at least at the Supreme Court of 
Canada level - can best be illustrated by considering the 
following two quotations from recent Supreme Court decisions. In 
both, the court attempted to defend its thinking about govern- 
mental liability. 
The first quotation is from a case considering special procedural 
privileges which the federal government attempted to confer on 
federal bureaucracies. In that case the Supreme Court of Canada 
said that:25 
. . . the Crown cannot be equated with an individual. The Crl wn represents 
the State. It constitutes the means by which the federal aspect of our 
Canadian society functions. It must represent the interests of all members of 
Canadian society in court claims brought against the Crown in right of 
Canada. The interests and obligations of the Crown are vastly different from 
those of private litigants making claims against the federal government. 
At virtually the same time, the court in Just v .  British C0lurnbia,~6 
through Mr. Justice Cory, writing for the majority, ruled that in 
25 See Rudolph Wolff & Co. Ltd. v. Canada, [I9901 1 S.C.R. 695,43 Admin. L.R. 1, at p. 8. 
In that case, the plaintiffs claimed that the federal government had breached fiduciary 
obligations, had breached contracts and was liable in tort in respect of negotiations 
involving the International Tin Council. The Crown brought a motion to have the action 
dismissed from the Supreme Court of Ontario and was successful. The Supreme Court of 
Canada held that s. 17(1) and (2) of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 10 (2nd 
Supp.), now R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, and s. 7(1) of the Crown Liability Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 
C-38, now R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50, s. 15(1), which vested exclusive jurisdiction to consider 
damage claims against the federal government, did not violate s. 15 of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. 
26 Supra, footnote 21. This view was also adopted by a minority of the Supreme Court in 
Tock v. St. John's Metropolitan Area Board (1989), 64 D.L.R. (4th) 620, [I9901 2 S.C.R. 
1181, where La Forest J. ,  writing for himself and Chief Justice Dickson, would have 
radically limited the ability of governmental bodies to exculpate themselves from liability 
in nuisance, by treating the liability of the governmental agency as indistinguishable from 
that of private individuals, and by dramatically limiting the defence of statutory 
authority. 
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general the duty of care in tort owed by a government agency is the 
same as that owed by one private person to another. These two 
contradictory ideas, I think, explain the tension between two 
realities which the court - and most of us, it is fair to say - simply 
cannot reconcile. 
The first historical reality is that courts and judges embody the 
institutional and human dimensions of the rule of law. Dicey said, 
almost a century ago, that all public authorities should be suable in 
common law courts and should be liable through the application of 
the same common law principles as would a private i n d i ~ i d u a l . ~ ~  
Abstractions from social context, combined with an overriding 
fear of bureaucratic power, have left us with a powerful and often 
unstated judicial reluctance to recognize the government, public 
bureaucrats or public institutions in general in the law of torts; and 
an equally pervasive paranoia about developing a "public tort 
law" which would operate according to a different set of ideas and 
values than does private tort law. 
That is the philosophy underlying Just, and it is not an 
unexpected outcome of Diceyian notions of the rule of law that the 
current model of judicial "tort" review consists largely of the 
application of modified private tort law concepts to governments. 
This approach reflects either the rudimentary development of 
public law - focusing as it has on process review - or perhaps a 
simplistic allegiance to Diceyian notions of the rule of law. It is 
generally accepted that Dicey was the strongest advocate of 
personal bureaucratic liability administered by common law 
courts and of the non-recognition of the "state" in the common 
law legal system. These two concepts lie at the heart of this 
component of the current model of government liability in tort. 
The second reality which the judges must, and certainly do, 
accept is that the government and public bureaucrats do not 
respond to liability risks in the same fashion as do private firms; 
that the allocation of legal liability to "the government" in fact 
represents risk spreading to taxpayers; that public bureaucrats, as 
individuals, participate in the delivery of public services and 
benefits which have no private analogues; that government action 
27 See A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. 
(London, MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1959). I make this point in more detail in D. Cohen, 
"Thinking about the State: Law Reform and the Crown in Canada" (1986), 24 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 379, at pp. 388-92. 
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may, to varying degrees and in complicated ways, represent the 
expression of the democratic will to which the judiciary should 
defer; that government responsibilities are established and 
defined through a complex of legislative and regulatory enact- 
ments which charge public bureaucrats with responsibilities in 
ways which private individuals and firms simply do not 
experience; that governments may represent monopolistic deliv- 
erers of services, imposing risks to which the public has no alter- 
native but to submit; and so on. 
These two realities simply cannot be reconciled. Formal notions 
of the rule of law embodied in our legal heritage tell us to treat 
governments and similar public authorities as if they were private 
firms. Almost everything else we know about modern bureau- 
cratic governments - what they are empowered to do, how they 
operate, their position in the modern state relative to courts and 
judges - tells us that to do so is both foolish and indefensible 
given what most of us are trying to achieve in tort law. Until we 
choose to reject attempts to assimilate the government to the 
position of private firms we will continue to read judgments which 
cannot be understood as anything but manifestations of this 
judicial schizophrenia. It is my view that recovery of economic 
losses for regulatory failures must continue to be adjudicated -if 
they remain in the court system at all - according to principles 
which necessarily differ from those applied to resolve disputes 
between private actors. 
Ill. THE SPECIAL TREATMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST GOVERNMENTS 
Since Kamloops, we have seen literally hundreds of cases 
struggle with a doctrine which asks that 19th century ideas about 
the role of the state in England be applied at the end of the 20th 
century in Canada. If one accepts the approach in Kamloops, the 
policy/operational distinction becomes the doctrinal tool which is 
employed to draw the line between claims which are compensable 
and those that are not. I have written about the variables which I 
see operating under the umbrella of that doctrine, and little would 
be gained by repeating them here.28 Recently, however, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has had the opportunity to reconsider 
28 See D. Cohen "The Public and Private Law Dimensions of the UFFI Problem: Part 11" 
(1983-84), 8 C.B.L.J. 410, at pp. 420-30. 
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its position on Kamloops. While the judgments are confusing, it is 
my sense that these cases reaffirm what is obviously a frustrated 
and ultimately fruitless commitment to treat the government as if 
it were a private firm and simultaneously to recognize the unique 
political character, fiscal environment and social responsibility of 
the modern Canadian state. 
What is clear, then, is that the analysis of the liability of central 
governments as well as of their subsidiary agencies will continue 
necessarily to involve several issues which have no counterpart in 
the analysis of the tort liability of private firms and individuals. 
The courts will continue to focus on the legislative and regulatory 
framework within which the bureaucracy operates to determine 
several issues fundamental to a determination of legal liability; 
they will continue to have to recognize the adjudicative responsi- 
bilities of many administrative agencies; the courts will have to 
continue to struggle with the complex issues associated with the 
identity of the bureaucrat/agency/government which is subject to 
liability; and, finally, the courts will continue to be sensitive to the 
very persuasive reasons for judicial deference to authorized 
bureaucratic activity. Recent cases confirm that the Supreme 
Court's half-hearted direction to equate the liability of public 
authorities with that of private firms is being and, I believe, will 
always be, distorted in a substantial majority of cases. 
The first issue which is unique to tort litigation involving govern- 
ments is the necessity for the court to investigate closely the 
regulatory environment in which the relevant bureaucrats operate 
in order to determine the kinds of interests which will be recog- 
nized in litigation, as well as the class of persons who will be able to 
pursue compensation if those interests are not respected. 
Government liability tort cases necessarily involve an assessment 
of the regulatory programme pursuant to which bureaucrats 
operate; where it is clear that the programme is designed to 
protect the economic interests of private citizens, economic loss is 
recoverable without serious debate.29 There is obviously no 
private situation which generates this legislatively focused inquiry. 
This is the point made by Madame Justice Wilson in Kamloops, where she addresses the 
"floodgates" risk by arguing that economic loss is only recoverable if it was within the 
purview of the statute as an interest which was protected by the relevant regulatory 
programme: see Kamloops (City) v. Nielson, supra, footnote 3, at pp. 679-80 D.L.R. See 
also, Bruce Feldthusen, "Economic Loss in the Supreme Court of Canada: Yesterday 
andTomorrow" (1991), 17 C.B.L.J. 356, at p. 362. 
Heinonline - -  2 0  Can. Bus. L.J. 2 2 4  1 9 9 2  
19921 Government Liability for Economic Losses 225 
Several recent decisions make this point unambiguously. In 
Brewer Bros. v .  Canada (Attorney General) ,3O several farmers had 
extended credit to a grain elevator operator licensed by the 
Canadian Grain Commission under the Canada Grain Act.31 The 
licensee went bankrupt and the farmers sued for, and successfully 
recovered, $420,000 from the federal government to compensate 
them for the economic losses incurred on the bankruptcy of the 
elevator operator. The court held that its decision as to whether a 
private law duty of care was owed by the government to the 
farmers "required an analysis of the statutory underpinnings 
which create the public duty" of the regulatory authority.32 The 
court justified its conclusion that a duty of care existed on the 
ground that the "primary purpose of the Canada Grain Act . . . 
was to protect the economic interests of the grain producers" .33 
The same approach, with a radically different outcome, was 
taken in Wirth v. Vancouver (City) .34 That case involved a claim in 
negligence brought by the plaintiff against the city for incorrectly 
calculating the square footage of a building to be constructed on 
property adjoining that of the plaintiff. A building was 
constructed which would not have been permitted by the appli- 
cable zoning by-laws, and which allegedly reduced the value of the 
plaintiffs property. The court interpreted the relevant zoning 
legislation as not being directed at protecting the economic 
interests of neighbouring owners of zoned property and clearly 
rejected recovery of pure economic loss on the basis of mere 
foreseeability of risk of inj~ry.3~ 
3 (1990), 66 D.L.R. (4th) 71,31 F.T.R. 191 (T.D.), vard80 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (C.A.). 
31 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 7, s. 35, now R.S.C. 1985, c. G-10, s. 45(1). A statutory conditionof 
licensing established under s. 36(l)(c), now s. 46(l)(c), was that the commission was 
satisfied that the licensee was financially able to carry on the elevator operation, and had 
given security sufficient to ensure that all of its contractual obligations to farmers could 
be met. Section 38 of the Act empowered the commission to obtain additional security 
where it had reason to believe and was of the opinion that the current security of the 
licensee was insufficient. 
32 Brewer v. Canada, supra, footnote 30, at p. 91 D.L.R. 
33 Ibid., at pp. 96 and 98 D.L.R. An almost identical approach and result was adopted in a 
New Zealand case, Steiller v. Porirua City Council, [I9861 1 N.Z.L.R. 84, in which the 
court interpreted the applicable legislation as providing protection to home buyers in 
respect of substandard construction materials. In that case, the court awarded damages 
to a homeowner who had purchased a home which had been constructed with 
substandard materials that had not been discovered on an inspection by the city. 
34 (1990), 71 D.L.R. (4th) 745, [I9901 6 W. W.R. 225 (B.C.C. A.). 
35 Similarly, in Akhtar v.  MacCillivray, supra, footnote 24, a case involving a claim against 
the Alberta Securities Commission, the court held (at p. 543 W.W.R.) that the "powers 
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In McGauley v. British C o l ~ r n b i a , ~ ~  Huddart J. was faced with a 
claim by a large group of investors who had lost their savings when 
a co-operative, which had been unlawfully acting as a financial 
institution, went bankrupt. The plaintiffs claimed that the Super- 
intendent of Co-operatives had been negligent in carrying out his 
regulatory responsibilities under the provincial Cooperative 
Association The court denied that the government had any 
duty of care to the depositors. After a close examination of the 
relevant legislation, the court held that the purpose of the legis- 
lation was to further the co-operative activities of licensed co-op- 
eratives, and not to protect the economic interests of members of a 
co-operative who mistakenly assumed that their directors' actions 
were authorized by their corporate const i tu t i~n.~~ 
Finally, in Yuen Kun Yeu v. Attorney-General of Hong K ~ n g , ~ ~  
the plaintiff suffered substantial financial losses after depositing 
funds in a registered institution which was subsequently liqui- 
dated. The Privy Council held that the legislation under which the 
company was registered was39a 
. . .designed to give added protection to the public against unscrupulous or 
improvident managers of deposit-taking companies, but it cannot 
reasonably be regarded . . . as having instituted such a far-reaching and 
stringent system of supervision as to warrant an  assumption that all deposit- 
taking companies were sound and fully credit-worthy. 
. . . in the regulators to allow for the protection of the public at large, [were] not intended 
to allow for a complementary, common law duty of care". 
In a recent decision involving a claim against the Toronto police force arising out of the 
alleged negligence of the police in failing to warn the plaintiff of the activities of a rapist, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal similarly rejected foreseeability as sufficient to trigger a 
duty of care, but only after the court closely analyzed sections of the Police Act to reach 
the conclusion that the police were under a duty of care to preserve the peace, prevent 
crime and apprehend offenders. In Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Board of 
Commissioners of Police (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 396 at pp. 426-7,48 C.C.L.T. 105, the 
court indicated that the police might owe a duty of care to a victim of a rapist given the 
circumstances which indicated that the police knew the rapist was active in a confined 
geographical area and was choosing victims with physical characteristics similar to those 
of the plaintiff. On appeal (1990), 72 D.L.R. (4th) 580, 74 O.R. (2d) 225 (C.A.), the 
same view was taken. 
36 (1990), 44 B.C.L.R. (2d) 217 (S.C.), appeal allowed pending further argument 56 
B.C.L.R. (2d) l(C.A.). 
3'R.S.B.C. 1979,~. 66. 
38 See also Kripps v. Touche Ross & Co. (1990), 52 B.C.L.R. (2d) 291 (S.C.) This decision 
employs the same analytical technique to deny governmental liability for economic losses 
arising out of the failure of the relevant government agencies to adequately review 
corporate prospectuses. 
39 [I9881 A.C. 175, [1987]2AllE.R. 705. 
3% Ibid., at p. 197 A.C. 
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As there was no scheme (according to the interpretation of the 
judges) to protect against financial loss, no duty of care was found. 
The recent English decisions which have overruled Anns will 
not significantly alter this aspect of the development of the legal 
liability of governmental institutions. These decisions, taken as a 
whole, emphatically reject the imposition of legal liability for 
failure to implement positive regulatory responsibilities based on 
mere foreseeability of risk of injury. On one view, this will 
confront legal decision-makers with some serious conceptual 
problems when faced with claims that public bureaucrats failed in 
some way to deliver regulatory benefits which the public, or a 
particular individual member of the public, expected to receive. In 
all of the recent cases discussed above, the courts respond to this 
issue by focusing their attention on the legislative and regulatory 
framework within which the bureaucracy operates to determine 
the kind of interests which ought to be recognized and the class of 
persons intended to be protected. As the cases indicate, in 
virtually all situations, an individual is claiming that the public 
bureaucrat failed to deliver some service or benefit for which he or 
she was responsible; and, in virtually all cases, the entitlement or 
regulatory activity or both has no private a n a l o g ~ e . ~  Claims 
against governments almost invariably introduce issues of non- 
feasance. In Kamloops, for all of its critics, the Supreme Court 
recognized that where bureaucrats are sued for failing to deliver 
regulatory benefits, the distinction between non-feasance and mis- 
feasance, whatever its merits in resolving and defining private 
conflicts and relations, should have little appli~ability.~~ 
It is not at all clear that the recent English cases will change this 
approach by very much. Judges, even if they adopt the recent 
English decisions and reject the two-stage Kamloops test, cannot 
avoid dealing with the intractable policy questions raised by 
government liability claims. If they were to accept the approach in 
these recent English cases, Canadian courts would be required to 
Thus, in Funk v.  Clapp (1986), 68 D.L.R. (4th) 229,35 B.C.L.R. (2d) 222 (C.A.), the 
court was asked to determine whether the police owed a duty of care to a man who 
committed suicide in a jail cell after he had been jailed without being deprived of his belt. 
The court held that the police were under a duty of care to ensure that people in custody 
were not able to injure themselves. 
41 In Scotland, the issue of non-feasance and the liability of public authorities in light of 
Anns was explicitly recognized in the case of vaccination liability claims in Banrhrone v. 
Secretary of State for Scotland, [I9871 S.L.T. 34. 
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determine whether a public authority is liable on the basis of a 
vague "close proximity" standard or an even more abstruse "fair 
and reasonable" test.42 The House of Lords, in Yuen Kun Yeu v. 
Attorney-General of Hong K ~ n g , ~ ~  explicitly restated the first 
stage of Anns as encompassing not only foreseeability, but also 
notions of a "necessary relationship", and went on to say that the 
analysis of the policy reasons for not imposing liability would be 
considered "only in a limited category of cases". Most recently, in 
Murphy v. Brentwood District C ~ u n c i l , ~ ~  the House of Lords in 
several judgments acknowledged that it would not in the future 
use the Anns approach. Instead, the courts will either require that 
the imposition of a legal duty of care be "fair or reasonable", or 
alternatively recognize a legal duty of care when there is a suffi- 
ciently close and proximate relationship between an individual 
plaintiff and the regulator. 
I am not sure that the change matters very much, either in terms 
of the outcome of the cases or in the arguments to which the courts 
will be sensitive. One concern might be that, by collapsing the 
KamloopslAnns standard into one principle, we will no longer see 
the explicit articulation and argument of the policy reasons for 
either imposing or not imposing liability which has become the 
hallmark of decisions involving government defendants during the 
past decade. I do not share this concern. A reading of the cases 
which purport to follow the recent English decisions demonstrates 
virtually no change from the Kamloops approach. For example, in 
deciding whether a duty of care existed in Murphy, the House of 
Lords itself was forced to inquire into the objectives of the legis- 
lation to determine whether there was anything in the terms of the 
legislation which would support the view that "the purpose of the 
statute was to protect owners of buildings from economic loss".45 
42 Thus, in Governors of Peabody Donation Fund v. Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd., 
[I9841 3 All E.R. 529, the House of Lords rejected the approach in Anns and held that a 
municipal authority did not owe a duty of care to safeguard developers against economic 
losses associated with negligent approval of construction plans, on the basis that it was 
not "just and reasonable" that a duty of care exist. This approach has been adopted in 
Canada in several decisions. In Longchamps v. Farm Credit Corp., supra, footnote 24, 
McDonald J. was faced with a claim that a firm suffered financial losses when its loan 
application was improperly assessed by the defendant government agency. He denied 
liability, holding that it would not be "just and reasonable" to impose a legal duty upon a 
lender to use reasonable care in assessing the financial affairs of a loan applicant. 
43 Supra, footnote 39. 
44 [1990] 3 W.L.R. 414. See also, Department of Environment v. T. Bates & Son Ltd., 
119901 3 W.L.R. 457. 
45 ~ u r p h ~  v.  Brennvood District Council, ibid., at p. 449. As I have discussed earlier, the 
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Tort claims against governmental authorities will also be 
characterized by concerns that tort law is being used as a vehicle to 
achieve judicial review of adjudicative decisions. A significant 
number of government liability cases will continue to address the 
potential liability of public authorities exercising judicial and 
quasi-judicial functions which traditionally, and for a number of 
very persuasive reasons, have been immunized from liabilit~.~6 
While one thinks that this immunity applies only to classic judicial 
activities, one gets a clear sense from reading the cases that a 
significant segment of regulatory activity involves the exercise of 
discretion in order to trigger judicial deference in subsequent tort 
claims. 
An example of the pervasiveness of this immunity is Yuen Kun 
Yeu v.  Attorney-General of Hong Kong itself.47 That case involved 
a group of depositors who attempted to recover money lost when 
the financial institution in which their funds were invested failed. 
The plaintiffs alleged that they relied on the government's regis- 
tration of the bank as an indication that it was credit-worthy and 
that the regulator responsible for such matters in Hong Kong 
knew, or should have known, that the directors of the bank were 
acting fraudulently. Lord Keith rejected the appellants' claim, 
emphasizing that there was not a sufficient degree of proximity in 
the relationship between the Commissioner and the appellant. In 
so doing, he implicitly accepted the policy operational distinction 
Supreme Court of Canada has recently reaffirmed its allegiance to the two-stage 
approach it had adopted in Kamloops. However, there are some Canadian cases which 
have clearly taken the English approach, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's 
direction. Nevertheless, these cases still require an analysis of the legislative framework 
in which the bureaucracy operates in order to determine the class of person which might 
benefit from a private right of action, as well as to articulate the kinds of interests 
protected as a result of the institution of the regulatory program: see Wirth v.  Vancouver 
(City), supra, footnote 34, at pp. 748-9 D.L.R. (foreseeability risk of economic loss is not 
sufficient to found a duty of care). 
46 For example, in French v.  Law Society of Upper Canada (1975), 61 D.L.R. (3d) 28, 9 
O.R. (2d) 473, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the investigative functions of the 
defendant were quasi-judicial in nature and thus did not give rise to liability in tort absent 
malice. The Supreme Court of Canada was faced with this issue in Nelles v.  Ontario 
(1989), 60 D.L.R. (4th) 609, [I9891 2 S.C.R. 170, in which the court held that prosecu- 
torial immunity for malicious prosecutorial decisions was contrary to the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, there are remarks in the judgment which 
suggest that historical immunities for "professional negligence" and related "errors of 
judgment" by parties exercising judicial and quasi-judicial functions may still be 
respected by the court: ibid., at p. 644,per Lamer J. See also, Birchard v.  Alberta (Secu- 
rities Commission) (1988),42D.L.R. (4th)300at pp. 310-11, [I9871 6 W.W.R. 536. 
47 Supra, footnote 39. 
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by alluding to the quasi-judicial nature of the Commissioner's 
decisions: "it might be a very delicate choice whether the best 
course was to deregister a company forthwith or to allow it to 
continue in business with some hope that . . . its financial position 
would improve".48 
The third aspect of government liability claims which has no 
private analogue is the intractable problem concerning the 
identity of the institutions and individuals who are the appropriate 
subjects of litigation. The problem has several sources. The first is 
the continued requirement, present in most Crown liability legis- 
lation, that the plaintiff demonstrate that an individual bureaucrat 
has committed a common law tort which has caused the losses 
sustained by the plaintiff - only then can the government be held 
vicariously liable under the relevant legi~la t ion .~~ The issue is 
complicated by the fact that many government agencies are not 
legal entities suable in tort, meaning that only the individual 
bureaucrat is subject to legal liability for which the Crown is vicari- 
ously liable.50 As well, it is becoming increasingly common to find 
that the relevant legislation insulates individual public employees 
from liability - either absolutely, or if they are acting in good 
faith.51 Courts have addressed, and will continue to address, both 
the constitutionality of such statutory immunities and, more 
problematically, will have to consider whether personal immunity 
will necessarily result in institutional immunity for the government 
itself .52 
48 Ibid., at p. 195 A.C. 
49 See, for example, the Crown Liability Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50, s. 3(a). 
50 Both these situations were presented in Air India Flight 182 Disaster Claimants v.  Air 
India (1987), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 317,62 O.R. (2d) 130, in which Holland J. dismissed claims 
against the federal Solicitor-General and Minister of Transport since the court could not 
recognize claims against persons in so far as they were being sued in their capacity as 
government officers. Similarly, the court dismissed claims against the Department of 
Transport and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service since they were not suable 
entities. 
51 See, for example, the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 25, which exempts police 
officers from liability if they act on "reasonable grounds"; and the Elevator and Fixed 
Conveyances Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. E-7, s. 9, which provides that inspectors are not liable 
for injury, loss or damage when acting pursuant to the Act. 
52 In G. (A . )  v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Family & Child Service) (1989), 61 
D.L.R. (4th) 136, [I9901 1 W.W.R. 61, supp. reasons at63 D.L.R. (4th)606n, the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal recognized the difficulty of applying s. 23 of the Family and 
Child Service Act, S.B.C. 1980, c. 11, which immunized individual social workers from 
liability for decisions taken in good faith, both in terms of its constitutionality and in 
respect of the implications for the vicarious liability of the government: ibid., at p. 153. 
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Finally, and most importantly, courts may be expected to 
continue, whether or not the Supreme Court shifts from its 
position in Just and Kamloops, to recognize the broad range of 
justifications for judicial deference to bureaucratic discretion. A 
substantial majority of very significant regulatory decisions are 
motivated by economic, social, and political factors. They 
represent public choices which mediate and reflect the conflicting 
interests and claims of large numbers of the public who stand to 
benefit or lose as a result of the exercise of regulatory power. For a 
variety of reasons - including institutional competence, respect 
for the exercise of democratic power, the acknowledgement of 
internal bureaucratic and external political accountability 
 mechanism^,^^ and the unavailability of standards against which to 
assess bureaucratic decisions - government liability claims will 
necessarily generate decisions which deny legal liability for 
reasons unique to government. 
Again, I do not believe that the recent English decisions, were 
they to be adopted in Canada, would generate any substantial 
modification in the approach which Canadian courts will take in 
responding to these issues. Any discussion of "proximity" or "the 
justness and reasonableness of imposing duties of care" - if 
judges do anything more than state their conclusions on the 
existence of a duty of care - requires courts to explain their 
concern with judicial deference to bureaucratic expertise, 
resource allocation decisions, and similar "policy" factors.54 In 
Longchamps v. Farm Credit Corp. ,55 McDonald J. purported to 
apply the recent English decisions, holding that it was not just and 
Similarly, in Gutek v. Sunshine Village Corp. (1990), 65 D.L.R. (4th) 406,103 A.R. 195, 
the court was faced with a section of the provincial statute regulating elevator operations 
which immunized individual bureaucrats from liability, and a section of the Alberta 
Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S. A. 1980, c. P-18, s. 5(c), which provides that 
any immunity that applies to employees also applies to the Crown. 
53 See D. Cohen, supra, footnote 28. 
s4 Perhaps the best example of this is in Hill Estate v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, 
[I9881 2 All E.R. 238, a case involving an unsuccessful claim of negligence against the 
defendant police force for failing to apprehend Peter Sutcliffe - the Yorkshire "Ripper" 
-before he killed Suzanne Hill. The House of Lords held that the police did not owe a 
duty of care to the victim and that foreseeability of risk of harm was not enough to trigger 
legal responsibility. The court went on at length to describe its views regarding the ability 
of the courts to assess police practices, their concern with distorting police investigative 
discretion, the diversion of police resources to the defence of legal suits and away from 
law enforcement activities, and so on. 
S5 Supra, footnote 24. 
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reasonable that a government agency would be responsible for 
losses suffered by a firm whose loan application was improperly 
assessed. His reasons, however, are indistinguishable from those 
which one might find in a decision applying Kamloops, one which 
focuses on the impact on the lender's cost of lending, on the 
impact on insurance requirements if the lender would be held 
liable, on the impact of liability on other borrowers and the tax- 
paying public and so on.56 In fact, he states explicitly that "it would 
be desirable to articulate the grounds upon which, as a matter of 
policy, it is or is not 'just and reasonable' to develop a new 
category [of negligen~e]".~~ 
Of course, the Supreme Court of Canada has not yet rejected 
the approach it developed in Kamloops. And as these recent cases 
suggest, even if it decided to reject Anns, I do not believe that 
much will change. For all of the reasons developed above, the 
courts will continue to address government liability claims using 
concepts and principles which have no counterpart in claims 
against private citizens and firms. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT LIABILITY - MORE OF THE 
PAST? 
Given these cases, and the Supreme Court's recent reaffir- 
mation of its position in Kamloops, it seems to me that govern- 
ments will continue to enjoy a broad immunity in respect of the 
vast majority of regulatory decisions which produce and allocate 
economic risks in the private sector. There are several reasons for 
the original reluctance of the courts to extend liability to govern- 
mental bodies in respect of regulatory action which generates 
economic risks, and for the continuation of this position in the 
recent cases discussed above. 
56 Another decision which purports to adopt the Kamloops two-stage approach, but in fact 
seems to integrate it with the more restrictive approach in Yuen and related cases, is a 
recent decision of the Alberta Supreme Court: Akhtar v. MacCillivray, [I9911 2 W.W.R. 
489,112 A.R. 242 (Q.B.). In that case, the court held that mere foreseeability of risk of 
injury to the investing public was insufficient to trigger a legal duty of care, and that a 
"close and direct" relationship between the regulator and individual plaintiff would be 
required. Here, as in Longchamps, the explanation for the decision was, as it must 
always be, expressed in policy terms, in particular, the concerns of the regulators with the 
investments of other individuals, and the degree and extent of control exercised by the 
regulator under the Alberta Securities Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. S-6, repealed and replaced 
by s. 199, Securities Act, 1981, S.A. 1981, c. S-6.1. 
57 Longchamps v. Farm Credit Corp., [I9901 6 W.W.R. 536 at p. 549,108 A.R. 115 (Q.B.). 
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First, for the past 30 years, the one overriding concern has been, 
and continues to be, the issue of whether the plaintiff was in an 
"individualized" relationship with some particular bureaucrat. 
This question has concerned the court both in assessing whether a 
particular bureaucratic decision is a "policy or operational 
decision" and in deciding whether, to use the doctrine enunciated 
in the recent English decisions, there is a relationship of sufficient 
proximity that it would be "just and reasonable" to impose a duty 
of care. 
This requirement of an individualized relationship first appears 
in Cleveland-Cliffs Steamships Co. v. The Queen,58 decided soon 
after the enactment of the federal Crown Liability Act;59 it was 
certainly present in Kamloops itself;60 and it reappears in cases 
like Yuen Kun Yeu v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong,'jl where 
the court explicitly rejected the plaintiffs claim, which was based 
on "institutional" rather than individualized reliance.62 We see it 
as well in cases like Birchard v. Alberta (Securities Cornmissi~n),~~ 
where the court is explicit in its reluctance to impose liability on 
regulatory agencies absent evidence of a particular decision or 
representation directed at a particular plaintiff who subsequently 
suffers a loss. 
"Institutional reliance" as the basis for imposing liability has 
been emphatically rejected by every court which has been asked to 
adopt it.@ Instead, the courts seem to require actual reliance by 
58 (1957), 10 D.L.R. (2d) 673 at pp. 679-80, [I9571 S.C.R. 810. 
59 Most of the provincial Crown liability legislation, like s. 3 of the federal Act, reinforce 
this approach by limiting governmental liability to vicarious liability for the common law 
torts of individual bureaucrats. Thus, in most cases, the necessary focus of litigation is not 
on institutional action and bureaucratic programmes, but rather on individual action and 
common law tort liability of individuals. 
60 The absence of this individualized relationship is perhaps what has caused much of the 
discussion around the Just decision. What is apparent, however, in cases like Just, is that 
this individualization of responsibility, which is most often found in judicial consider- 
ation of regulatory activity generating economic risks, will not be a prerequisite to 
liability in cases which involve risks of personal injury. That distinction is an extremely 
important one, which appears to have been ignored in most analyses of government 
liability in Canada. 
61 [I9881 A.C. 175, [I9871 2 All E.R. 705 (P.C.). 
62 Ibid., at p. 189 A.C. In that case it was clear that the House of Lords was rejecting any 
argument that depositors' generalized reliance on the existence of regulatory functions 
exercised by the Colony's Commissioner of Deposit-taking Companies would justify the 
impositionof a duty of care in tort. 
63 Supra, at footnote 46. In that case, the court held that neither the Alberta Securities 
Commission nor the Law Society of Alberta owed a duty of care to individual creditors of 
a defunct company, on the ground that the plaintiff did not actually rely on any particular 
representation of fiscal status by either party. 
64 In McGauley v. British Columbia (1990), 44 B.C.L.R. (2d) 217 at p. 234 (S.C.), Huddart 
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the plaintiff on the specific low-level bureaucratic decision or 
or at least knowledge of the identity of the potential 
plaintiff as a member of a limited, defined class of potential 
victims.66 
J. held that reliance on statutory duties of auditors would not give rise to liability absent a 
demonstration of actual reliance by the investors. In Kripps v. Touche Ross & Co. 
(1990), 52 B.C.L.R. (2d) 291 at p. 307 (S.C.), Boyd J. rejected a claim of liability based 
on "indirect reliance or reliance on the regulatory process or reliance upon the statutory 
duties set out in the securities legislation". 
Another example of this approach is the decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
in Nova Scotia (Attorney-General) v. Aza Avramovitch Associates Ltd. (1985), 11 
D.L.R. (4th) 588, 62 N.S.R. (213) 181. In that case, an architect sued the province in 
negligence for the Department of Health's inspection and approval of the location and 
design of a defective sewage system. At trial, 58 N.S.R. (2d) 267 sub nom. Nova Scotia 
Home for Coloured Children v. Aza Abramovitch Associates Ltd., the architect 
succeeded against the province on the ground that the Board of Health "knew or ought to 
have known [the approval] would be relied upon by people . . .": quoted, ibid., at p. 596 
D.L.R. An appeal by the province was allowed as the judge found that the architect did 
not rely on either the permit or the officials' opinion. In fact, there was evidence that the 
architect knew nothing about the board's activities. The court went on to say, however, 
that "if [one] had relied on that certificate . . . the inspectors would have been clearly 
liable for negligence under the well-known doctrine of Hedley Byrne . . .": ibid., at p. 607 
D.L.R. 
65 Thus, the negligent zoning in Wirth v. Vancouver (City), supra, footnote 34, was held not 
to give rise to liability since there was no reliance by the plaintiff on the inaccurate calcu- 
lation of the square footage of a building on property adjoining that of the plaintiff. And 
in Brewer Bros. v. Canada (Attorney General) (1990), 66 D.L.R. (4th) 71,31 F.T. R. 191 
(T.D.), vard 80 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (C.A.), the court, while it found a duty of care on the 
basis of its interpretation of the purpose of the Canada Grain Act, also found actual 
reliance by the farmers. In the court's opinion the farmers were protected in part, 
because the Grain Commission had issued a license which indicated that a sufficient bond 
had been posted by the company, and in part because the court believed that "the plain- 
tiffs' relied on the bond to protect them in the case of. . . default": ibid., at p. 99 D.L.R. 
Similarly, in Hendrick v. DeMarsh (1984), 6 D.L.R. (4th) 713, 45 O.R. (2d) 463 
(H.C.J.), affd 26 D.L.R. (4th) 130,54 O.R. (2d) 185 (C.A.), a plaintiff (hostel owner) 
sued the Ontario Ministry of Correctional Services for not informing them of a prisoner- 
guest's inclination to set fires. The action was unsuccessful because of an expired 
limitation period, but the judge went on to write that, if this had not been the case, the 
plaintiff could succeed against the ministry: "[the parole officer's] affirmative answer to 
the question whether DeMarsh was reliable implied that there was no peculiar risk 
involved in accepting DeMarsh": ibid., at p. 732 D.L.R. Outside of the statutory bar the 
ministry would have been liable for the probation officer's negligent misrepresentation to 
the plaintiff. 
@ See Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Board of Commissioners, supra, 
footnote 35, at pp. 426-7 D.L.R. On appeal, (1990), 72 D.L.R. (4th) 580 at p. 584, 74 
O.R. (2d) 225 (C.A.), the court held that foreseeability of risk of harm would be insuffi- 
cient to trigger liability, but continued that the plaintiffs claim could proceed assuming 
that she was part of a known and distinct group of potential victims. Similarly, in Air 
India Flight 182 Disaster Claimants v.  Air India, supra, footnote 50, the court suggested 
that, while the federal government, through the Department of Transport and the 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, did not owe a duty of care to the entire flying 
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A second and perhaps more important explanation for judicial 
conservatism in addressing economic negligence is the realization 
that in a significant subset of cases, in particular in cases of govern- 
mental licensing and inspection activities, the imposition of 
liability on the government might distort otherwise efficient 
private-market mechanisms which are available to deal with the 
relevant risk. That is, private tort liability risks represent an 
economic signal to private firms; such risks provide an incentive to 
make cost-justified investments in accident reduction, and would 
otherwise be represented in pricing decisions in private market 
transactions. The incentive effects of tort law, and the reduced 
demand in the relevant market due to the risk-induced increase in 
price, would be seriously attenuated if regulatory authorities were 
to bear fiscal responsibility for losses associated with inadequate 
market goods or services.(j7 It is this concern which logically 
explains the decisions in cases like Yuen(j8 and Murphy(j9 and 
Governors of Peabody Donation Fund.70 To find a regulator liable 
in cases where the regulatory activity involves inspection and 
public, they might owe a duty of care to those identified persons flying on a particular 
flight. 
67 Thus, for example, in the case of potential liability for losses associated with adverse 
reactions to vaccines, there is evidence in the United States that in 1987 at least one 
company raised the per dose cost of diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccine from $4.29 
(U.S.) to $11.40 (U.S.) as a result of the establishment of a self-insurance mechanism to 
respond to product liability risks associated with the vaccine. Similarly, Connaught 
Laboratories announced an increase of $3 per dose to cover the cost of self-insurance: see 
"Medical groups urge program to compensate vaccine victims", supra, footnote 7. To the 
extent that product liability risks are shifted from the private sector to public revenues, 
the incentive effects of legal liability risks and the impact of price increases on demand 
will be attenuated. 
Of course, the issue is more complicated than that presented above. If the delivery of 
the good or service is mandated by legislation, then the decrease in demand associated 
with price increases will be substantially less than would be the case if the market were 
operating more freely. As well, it is possible for the government, which faces contingent 
liability risks, to shift those risks to the relevant firms through a licensing system, thus 
replicating the market impact of direct firm liability. Whether we do this or not depends 
not only on our interest in incentive effects, but also on our sense of equal treatment and 
access to the relevant service or good. 
Supra, footnote 61. 
69 Supra, footnote 44. In that decision, Lord Mackay as well as Lord Bridge noted the 
obvious link between the imposition of legal liability on regulatory authorities and the 
tort liability of private enterprise: ibid., at pp. 430 and 439. 
70 [I9841 3 All E.R. 529. The Privy Council in that case noted explicitly both their concern 
that governmental liability might "safeguard building developers against economic loss 
resulting from their failure to comply with approved plans", and the equally relevant 
concern that governmental liability might insulate homeowners who failed to comply 
with regulatory requirements: ibid., at pp. 534-5. 
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licensing of private firms and market activities would immunize 
such firms from at least some substantial portion of the economic 
losses which their private action generates. 
Perhaps the clearest example of this concern is a recent decision 
of the Alberta Supreme Court, Gutek v. Sunshine Village C ~ r p . ~ l  
That case was initiated by a plaintiff who sued SVC for recovery of 
personal injury damages suffered when she fell from a chair lift. 
SVC joined the Alberta government, alleging that it was negligent 
in its failure to inspect the lift facilities, and in its subsequent 
licensing of SVC to operate the ski lift. The court held that the 
relevant legislation might impose on the government a duty of care 
to members of the public in respect of personal safety risks. 
However, the court held that no duty of care was owed by the 
government to Sunshine and that the purpose of the legislation 
was "not to hold safe from liability the designer, manufacturer, 
installer or owner of ski lifts".72 
A third explanation for the acceptance of a substantial sphere of 
immunity around government action is that judges are becoming 
increasingly sensitive to the unique environment in which public 
bureaucrats operate - sensitive, that is, to the bureaucratic incen- 
tives which are not commonly found in the case of private firms. 
One finds judges finally acknowledging that public bureaucracies 
and public bureaucrats are unlikely to be deterred by the 
economic risks represented by potentially adverse legal 
decisions.73 Public bureaucracies are not constrained by the kinds 
of markets in which private corporations must survive. And one 
finds increasing evidence that public institutions will formally or 
informally insulate their civil servants from personal responsibility 
for civil wrongs committed in the course of fulfilling their 
regulatory resp~nsibilities.~~ Simultaneously, judges are acknowl- 
- 
71 Supra, footnote 52. 
72 What thecourt apparently ignores is that the distortion of private markets will occur both 
where the government implicitly insures the "supplier" of a particular good or service 
directly by sharing liability to a injured consumer, and where the government implicitly 
insures the supplier through the imposition of direct tort liability to the consumer. In 
both cases, the supplier's expected accident exposure is reduced in precisely the same 
amount. 
73 Thus, in Hill Estate v.  Chief Constable, supra, footnote 54, the House of Lords argued 
that imposing liability on the police would not appreciably reinforce the general sense of 
public duty which motivates police forces: see D. Cohen, supra, footnote 2. 
74 There are innumerable examples of legislative immunities applicable to specific bureauc- 
racies or  bureaucrats. There is no evidence that the courts are interpreting these provi- 
sions narrowly: see G. (A , )  v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Child & Family 
Heinonline - -  2 0  Can. Bus. L.J. 236 1992 
19921 Government Liability for Economic Losses 237 
edging that bureaucrats are likely to respond to the expectations 
generated in and by the internal "bureaucratic culture" of which 
they are an integral part, and may be over-deterred by threats of 
legal liability.75 For both these reasons, legal liability risks simply 
cannot be expected to generate the same kind of deterrent or 
regulatory responses that are assumed to occur in private firms. 
Fourth, judges are increasingly recognizing the loss-spreading 
and insurance implications of extending liability in tort for 
economic risks against public institutions. The conclusion that 
judges seem to be reaching is that members of the tax-paying 
public would not be willing to pay an implicit insurance premium 
(hidden in their taxes) for protection against many of the 
economic risks for which individual plaintiffs are seeking 
recovery.76 In Longchamps v. Farm Credit Corp. ,77 liability for 
economic losses was denied because of judicial concerns about the 
impact of legal liability risks on the lender's cost of lending, the 
impact on insurance requirements if the lender were held liable, 
and the impact of liability on the tax-paying public. 
These views should be contrasted with the remarks of La Forest 
J. in Rothfield v. M a n ~ l a k o s , ~ ~  a case that involved municipal 
liability and defective construction. La Forest J. first acknowl- 
edged that the inspection and supervision of construction sites 
increases expenses for everyone involved in the enterprise; he 
then noted that, in his view, most of us would justify the increased 
expense as an investment, given that faulty construction creates 
health and safety risks. These divergent views on public attitudes 
towards various kinds of risk cannot be answered except by 
empirical studies which, not surprisingly, are absent from both 
judgments. 
Service), supra, footnote 52 (good faith immunity under the Family Child and Service 
Act required only that the social worker honestly believe that a child was in danger). 
75 See Yuen Kun Yeu v .  Attorney-General, supra, footnote 39, at p. 198 A.C., where the 
Privy Council suggested that the regulators' judgement might be seriously inhibited by 
the prospect of legal liability risks, and that bureaucratic effectiveness might be adversely 
affected by defensive strategies adopted by regulators in an effort to avoid or  reduce 
contingent liability in tort. 
76 Thus, in the trial decision in Wirth v .  Vancouver (City), (1990), 71 D.L.R. (4th) 745 at p. 
748, [I9901 6 W.W.R. 225 (B.C.C.A.), the judge refused to impose liability for economic 
losses associated with negligent zoning approval in part on the ground that "owners and 
tenants would have to pay if such a duty of care exists . . . and I do not see why residents 
should pay for the kind of economic loss which occurred here". 
77 Supra, footnote 57. 
78 (1989),63 D.L.R. (4th)449, [I9891 2S.C.R. 1259. 
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Finally, even as they say that they will not review "policy" 
decisions and will treat the government like a private firm when it 
acts "operationally", the courts are clearly doing something quite 
different. In the case of "operational" decisions, they are 
acknowledging that the statutory framework in which the 
bureaucracy  operate^,'^ budgetary issues, and the conflicting 
demands placed on public resources and personnel will signifi- 
cantly affect the standard of care expected of public agencies and 
public  bureaucrat^.^^ As well, at least some courts are recognizing 
that the pressing public need to permit bureaucrats to act quickly 
and without fear of liability will, in particular situations - for 
example in the case of child apprehension legislation - justify 
judicial deference to bureaucratic choices which might not be the 
case if a private firm, motivated by profit, were the defendant.81 
V. CONCLUSION 
Regulatory failure and the consequent liability of public 
officials to claims pursued through the avenue of private tort law 
has attracted a great deal of interest and much comment and 
debate about the rhetoric of judicial intervention. The quantity 
and the level of discussion in this country regarding the perceived 
benefits of adopting or ignoring the recent decision of the House 
of Lords in Murphy (and, thereby, either completely rejecting or 
once again affirming the AnnslKamloops approach) is astonishing 
given the substantive outcomes of the decisions in these cases. It 
79 See Fletcher v.  Manitoba Public Insurance Co. (1991), 74 D.L.R. (4th) 636 at pp. 655-6, 
[I9901 3 S.C.R. 191, where, in assessing the liability in negligence of a provincial 
automobile insurance company established by statute, the Supreme Court of Canada 
said that the standard of care expected of the public insurer would be different and lower 
than that of a private insurer in light of the institutional setting in which the public 
insurer's agents operated, and in view of a statutory exemption from a licensing 
requirement. 
NIn Just v. British Columbia (1989), 64 D.L.R. (4th) 689, [I9891 2 S.C.R. 1228, Cory J. 
said that the standard of care expected of the provincial rock scaling crews engaged in 
"operational" inspections would have to be assessed in light of the fiscal constraints faced 
by the Department and of competing demands for public resources. 
81 For example, in G. (A, )  v.  British Columbia (Superintendent of Family & Child Service), 
supra, footnote 52, the B.C. Court of Appeal took a very relaxed view of the standard of 
care expected of social agency workers who apprehended a child they believed to be in 
danger of sexual abuse by a family member. In a companion case, involving the failure to 
apprehend a child who was a victim of sexual abuse, the court refused to review a trial 
decision which found that the social worker was not negligent even though she failed to 
abide by the policy set down by the Superintendent of Family and Child Service: see 
M. (M.) v.  K. (K.) (1989), 61 D.L.R. (4th) 392 at p. 405,38 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273. 
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would not, in fact, be unreasonable to characterize the entire issue 
as something of a "tempest in a teapot". The "teapot" metaphor is 
particularly apt given the foregoing discussion of the irrelevant 
nature of the results of the debate as to whether Kamloops or 
Murphy ought to be applied; the results will remain the same in 
either event. Even those commentators arguing in favour of the 
retention of the Karnloops doctrine have recognized the essential 
similarity in result regardless of the test applied. The concern is 
not with the articulation of the rule as much as it is with the 
reactionary rhetoric in the cases.82 
Given such a state of affairs, and if tort law is the appropriate 
vehicle to use in addressing regulatory failure, it is clear that the 
major difficulty to be faced in this area of the law does not arise 
from a debate about the precise linguistic formulation of the rule 
to be applied. The real problem is inherent in the lack of the 
judicial will to establish a clearly defined model through which to 
address the responsibility of the modern state towards those 
citizens injured through the mismanagement of its regulatory 
activities. The current doctrinal debate over the primacy of 
"proximity" or "foreseeability" as the formal test of the existence 
of a duty of care is only relevant to the extent that it recognizes 
that the legal liability of governments cannot be formulated on the 
same basis as that of a private firm or individual. 
Close examination of the judgments on government liability 
invariably indicates that the state's duty stems from the legislative 
or regulatory scheme which imparts both the proximity and the 
foreseeability which finally becomes the issue in the Kamloops 
versus Murphy debate. This is a completely different argument 
than the test of "who in law is my neighbour?" as framed by Lord 
Atkin in M'Alister (or Donoghue) v. S t e v e n s ~ n . ~ ~  The modern 
82 Earl A. Cherniak and Kirk F. Stevens argue in "Two Steps Forward or One Step Back? 
Anns at the Crossroads in Canada" supra, p. 165, that AnnslKamloops should remain the 
test of choice in Canada. They do this, in part, by demonstrating that the result in Caparo 
Industries PIC v .  Dickman, [I9901 1 All E.R. 568, which was decided some six months 
prior to  Murphy but clearly heralded the demise of Anns by determining that 
"proximity" would be the touchstone of liability in England, would have been the same 
had Anns been applied. They are concerned, as is Feldthusen, that some of the language 
in Murphy is "reactionary to the point [that it threatens] to overturn or retard many 
modern developments in products liability and public authority law": see Feldthusen, 
supra, footnote 29, at p. 369. 
s3 [I9321 A.C. 562 at p. 580. On one view, Lord Atkin was attempting to ensure that such a 
duty might be found where the parties "created" a relationship by their actions in 
relation to one another. The duty of care under which the state might be said to labour is 
created, at least in part, by bureaucratic policy, regulation and legislation. 
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Canadian state is, after all, far more the unique functionary 
defined by the Supreme Court in Rudolph Wolff & Co., Ltd. v. 
Canada,84 than it is in any way analogous to one's next-door 
neighbour or to a commercial enterprise, regardless of size and 
scope. 
There are two further points which must be made in conclusion. 
The first, which I made at the outset, is that, notwithstanding the 
tremendous amount of energy expended in debating and 
commenting upon this particular area of law, the reality seems to 
be that at least some governments are minimally affected by its 
application. As mentioned earlier, both the legal and popular 
rhetoric suggest an image of governments under attack in the 
courts. The data we have on the legal liability of the federal 
government suggests precisely the opposite. 
The second point is that the entire argument might be better 
framed in a completely different way. The latter half of the 20th 
century brought with it a dramatic expansion of the role of the 
modern welfarelregulatory state in Canada. The expansion took 
place both in tort law (product liability and medical malpractice 
being the best-known examples), and in government (for 
example, in the expansion of Crown corporations involved 
directly in market activities, and in the development of a range of 
licensing and public insurance regimes to monitor, control and 
spread private market risks). The expansion of the Canadian state 
reflected two things. One was that the public good might not 
always be achieved through traditional market vehicles; market 
failure should be addressed, first, by shifting losses through tort 
law and, more dramatically, by regulating the activity through 
centralized licensing and monitoring mechanisms. The second was 
that the growth of the modern Canadian state acknowledged the 
value of social insurance for a broad range of individual risks 
which, while they might be insured privately, could be more 
efficiently and equitably spread through loss-shifting mechanisms 
triggered by contingent tort liability or by public regulatory and 
insurance regimes. 
As we reach the end of the century, this naive vision and 
aspiration for a better world, through more and more regulatory 
action by an increasingly centralized government, with an 
expanded private tort law serving as the ultimate arbiter of 
g4 [I9901 1 S.C.R. 695,43 Admin. L.R. 1. 
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fairness and competence, has few supporters. Like market failure, 
"government failure" has become all too common. Yet it is not 
clear what we should do once we admit this. To ask that we return 
to the "pure" market is to aspire to the economic, social and 
political conditions of the 19th century. It also begs the question: is 
tort law a fitting response to governmental failure under these or 
any circumstances? I would argue that it is not. 
One response to government failure is private tort law. As we 
have seen since the middle of this century, tort law is perhaps an 
appropriate vehicle to respond to the same kinds of accident-gen- 
erating activities which first justified its application to private 
actors and institutions. However, we have also seen that tort law 
has not, and likely cannot, be effectively employed by the 
judiciary to respond to government failure at anything more than 
the most "micro" level of bureaucratic action. And yet, all of the 
decisions which reflect judicial defence to public institutions, 
regardless of the policy and doctrinal grounds for governmental 
immunity, present serious problems to anyone concerned with 
creating institutions which foster effective and accountable 
government. If government fails, and the legal system does not 
respond, what 
The picture I have painted of the ways in which the legal system 
has and, in my view, will continue to respond to economic negli- 
gence should be understood as an admission that an enormous 
range of regulatory activity currently occurs without effective 
compensatory or deterrent mechanisms in place to respond to 
maladministration. To say that the legal system is an inappropriate 
vehicle to address these claims is not to say that they should be 
ignored. And yet, at the end of the day, that is precisely what tort 
law does. I leave for another time any suggestions as to other, 
more appropriate mechanisms with which society might respond. 
85 TO say that the traditional electoral process is the vehicle through which to address 
governmental failure is facile. We are talking not about free trade, sales tax legislation, 
constitution-making, or national defence initiatives in foreign countries. Rather we are 
dealing with serious losses generated by maladminstration across the bureaucracy in 
ways which are invisible except to the particular victims of bureaucratic incompetence. 
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